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Abstract 
In this study we examine autoethnographic data from three critical incidents as experienced by 
the first author (FA) demonstrating the importance of context in understanding medically 
unexplained symptoms, their incidence and underlying patterns.  We make the case for 
ethnographies as a crucial research strand in discerning the finer aspects of the patient or client 
experience; aspects that might be missed where people are directed along protocolised 
pathways of care.  The article describes care as fragmented and depersonalising, leading to 
disembodied exchanges, as reflected in other autoethnographic studies, particularly those that 
highlight the complex relationship and controversies surrounding diagnostic uncertainty.  We 
observe that psychological therapists, given the quality of the therapeutic relationship and 
sustained attention to the SHUVRQ¶V experience, are well placed to assist in the necessary 
processes of re-contextualisation and re-embodiment.   
 
Key words: psychosomatic pain, medically unexplained symptoms, trauma, patient narratives, 
depersonalisation, autoethnography 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Medically unexplained symptoms account for up to one in five of all GP consultations and 30% 
of these are subsequently found to have an associated psychiatric disorder ± usually depression 
or anxiety (RCGP, 2014).  It is generally understood that medically unexplained and somatic 
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symptoms can be triggered or exacerbated by emotional distress, which the person can 
experience directly or indirectly.  A 2010 study found up to 10% of all NHS spending was 
incurred by somatising patients, and the total cost including sickness absences to be over £14 
billion per annum (Bermingham et al, 2010).   Common examples of physical symptoms that 
may arise or are exacerbated during times of emotional distress include eczema, alopecia, 
fibromyalgia, or irritable bowel syndrome.   
Contemporary literature suggests a stigma associated with pain and other symptoms where 
there is a diagnostic uncertainty (e.g. Wilbers, 2015; Anderson et al, 2012; Gask et al, 2011).  
This can lead to suspicion and breakdowns in the relationships between the sufferer and health 
practitioners, their carers, family members, and other interested parties such as employers.  The 
sufferer may feel that nobody understands them leading to, and perpetuating existing, feelings 
of alienation. 
Controversy and confusion surround terms such as µSV\FKRVRPDWLF¶ and µSV\FKRJHQLF¶ ± with 
existing evidence suggesting that these terms still imply that symptoms are µDOO in the PLQG¶ 
and thus that µWKHUH¶V nothing wrong with \RX¶ (Ricciardi, 2014; Leone, 2011).  Many people 
dread such a diagnosis because the implication is that their symptoms will no longer be taken 
seriously (Hinton et al, 2016; Mobini, 2015).  Some strongly resist and fiercely reject the idea 
of a psychological element to their symptoms/experience and may even believe their symptoms 
indicate that something is seriously wrong but is being missed.   
The current study is a continuation of previous research into the topic by the First Author (FA), 
a trained psychological therapist, having himself suffered from chronic pain for sixteen years.  
This culminated, in 2014, in an autoethnographic study into chronic pain, and what appeared 
to be its psychosomatic qualities.  As in all ethnographic study, particular attention is drawn to 
the contexts in which events acquired meaning, and it was discovered that these contexts had 
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significant therapeutic value.  This article will explore three critical incidents typical of the data 
derived from the study and we will use these to highlight the importance of context.  In doing 
so we make the wider case for ethnography as a crucial research strand for advancements in 
the ways psychological therapists work with somatisation and medically unexplained 
symptoms (MUS).   
 
MUS and the Counselling and Psychotherapy Profession 
The substantive literature on MUS comes from medical discourses.  Yet there is a continued 
reluctance in the counselling and psychotherapy (therapy) profession to engage with this 
literature, with  strong antagonisms sometimes  expressed by counselling and psychotherapy 
(therapy) practitioners towards the medical model (Lees, 2011).  This, arguably, began with 
the work of Carl Rogers in the early 1950s when he used the term µFOLHQWV¶ rather than 
µSDWLHQWV¶ The challenges to the medical model have increased in recent years in response to 
the increasing influence of evidence based practice and managed care on the profession with 
its emphasis on medical model principles (Lees, 2016).  This development has, for several 
years, been rebutted by some therapists: therapy is µQRW a branch of medicine nor an activity 
ancillary to medicine. Most forms of therapy do not focus exclusively on the relief of 
symptoms, but emphasise creating and exploring a UHODWLRQVKLS¶ (Alliance, 2009).  Attitudes, 
leading to a disinterest in medically-orientated literature, are problematic since this literature 
contains many valuable insights.   In contrast to such antagonisms, the article unashamedly 
draws on medically-orientated literature and aims to break down the conceptual barriers 
separating these disciplines. Moreover, we believe it is essential to maintain a congruence 
between the approach taken in the current study, that is holistic and integrative, and the 
problematising of the psyche-soma split.  
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One primary criticism leveled against medical thinking is that it fails to take into account social, 
political and economic factors; that is to say, it is reductive.  Yet there is a substantial body of 
literature which includes client stories which stands between medically-orientated and 
psychotherapeutic literature and this µLQWHUPHGLDWH¶ literature includes contextual factors 
(Fisher and Lees, 2015).  Indeed this study will cite several examples of this literature.  It will 
also adopt ethnographic methods which are explicitly concerned with examining conceptual 
factors. 
      
Ethnography and patient narratives 
There is a clear case to be made for ethnography and patient narratives in the field of healthcare 
research.  Andersen and Risør (2014) observed that even where qualitative research is 
undertaken, for example in research into why a patient may delay seeking healthcare, the 
themes that are extracted are often µRQH-ZD\¶ and have the quality of µWKLQ GHVFULSWLRQ¶ (in 
contrast to µWKLFN GHVFULSWLRQ¶ in Geertz, 1973) that limit the capacity of the research to provide 
genuine and useful insight into the lived experience of the patient.      The authors observed 
that where themes are identified, such as the patient not wanting to bother their GP or to appear 
as a hypochondriac, or where a woman delays healthcare seeking because she µGLG not put 
herself ILUVW¶ there is little or no investigation into the social and historical contexts of why a 
patient might have these attitudes.   
A substantial body of auto-ethnographic literature demonstrates its value as a methodological 
approach (good examples include Neville-Jan 2003 and Ettore, 2005) in providing insights into 
the lived experience of symptoms. Wilbers, whose (2015) autoethnography explored the 
impacts and meanings of her PRWKHU¶V chronic pain and treatment, made the case for patient 
narratives so that practitioners may more fully appreciate and even anticipate the patient 
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experience, and argued that this may have tangible implications for, say, whether or not to 
prescribe medication.  Following spinal cord injury that resulted in permanent paralysis Clifton 
(2014) wrote that µQDUUDWLYH VWRU\LQJ¶ can help the patient work through the grief of losing the 
use of their limbs and indeed the life that they had before the injury, but believed there was not 
enough literature available about the processes of adapting to life-changing injuries and 
illnesses that would have helped him as a patient going through it.  Barry (2006) argued that a 
problem with Randomised Controlled Trial methodologies was that they measured the easily 
measurable and typically excluded subtle, but complex, inputs and outputs.  Furthermore she 
argued that these same methodologies typically excluded or only gave passing consideration 
to the contexts in which pathologies appeared, citing evidence from psychoneuroimmunology 
that a SHUVRQ¶V prognoses could be heavily determined by their beliefs about health and disease.  
Barry noted that µWKH use of anthropological forms or evidence may be more helpful in 
providing a measure of how therapies are working on the real patient in the real world, not on 
the statistically average SDWLHQW¶LELd p2655).  
 
In this article our intention is to add to the literature on the SDWLHQW¶V lived experience by 
providing a narrative, µWKLFN GHVFULSWLRQ¶ (Geertz, 1973) of an experience of medically 
unexplained symptoms and the biopsychosocial contexts in which they are situated.  As an 
autoethnogaphic study, the investigation is based on lived experience as the primary data 
source.  An ethnographer records µVFUDWFK QRWHV¶ as they listen and observe so as to aid memory 
during later analysis (Suzuki et al 2005).  During the formal period of research in 2014, an app 
on a phone was used to record any impressions about experience, physical or otherwise, that 
felt pertinent to the study of chronic pain and several times a week this raw data was explored 
for meaning through purposeful diarying.  During and after observation, ethnographers ask 
questions about the meaning of behaviour and events (Gerrish and Lacey, 2010).  The raw data 
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is the µWLS of LFHEHUJ¶ ± the visible 10% of the berg indicating an invisible 90% percent 
submerged in the depths - and the diary considered what might be indicated by the particular 
data that had been recorded.  Very often links from present experience would be established to 
historical events, memories and dream material.  The app took on the character of a 
seismograph as the FA was able to record each µWUHPRU¶ in real-time.  The practice of recording 
experience in this way facilitated the development of an embodied awareness which enabled 
the psychosocial triggers and patterns underpinning the flare ups of his physical symptoms to 
be understood more directly -  a habit cultivated during the formal research period which Roth 
(2012) describes as µSHUFHSWXDO WXQLQJ¶  We will consider later the implications for practice of 
the findings of this research and how as practitioners we can assist sufferers of medically 
unexplained symptoms to develop their own embodied awareness, make sense of their 
condition and manage the psychosocial impacts, for example on identity and relationships.   
 
The following sections describe three critical incidents from the )$¶V autoethnographic 
research regarding chronic pain.  Each incident is described in the form of thick description 
which includes the psycho-social context of the experience.  It is then followed by a brief 
reflection to link the experience to the extant literature.  In the first incident, the )$¶V lived 
experience of his pregnant ZLIH¶V ultrasound scan and his symptoms unexpectedly flaring up 
µVHWV the VFHQH¶ in terms of establishing contextual reference points in the present day.  The 
second incident is a historic event ± a traumatic bereavement experience at the age of eighteen 
seems to have been the origin of his chronic symptoms.  The final incident, an anxiety attack 
on a bus, captures the experience of depersonalisation ± an µRXW of body H[SHULHQFH¶ that will 
help us to demonstrate the dynamics of disassociation, its links to µFRQVHUYDWLRQ ZLWKGUDZDO¶ 
mechanisms that perform a comparable function to the fight or flight reflex. Each narrative 
stresses the physical elements of the experience, and indeed grounds experience in the physical 
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frame of reference.  Our purpose is to challenge the dualistic concept of mental distress vis-à-
vis physical distress that still prevails in conventional medicine (Edwards et al, 2010) and 
which is now infiltrating the therapy profession as a result of the influence of government-
sponsored therapy in the form of the IAPT scheme.  One problem with this scheme is that 
complex and multi-faceted problems are presented as being treatable by psychological 
therapists who do not have an understanding of the broader context (see Lees, 2016).  Placing 
somatic experience at the centre of the narrative is appropriate in a discussion of psychological 
phenomena today in view of the recognition, in recent years, of the somatic aspects of 
psychological problems.  This idea has been around for a long time (Steiner, 1920) but has, 
more recently, been acknowledged by a considerable number of scientific researchers who 
have identified the relationship between trauma and the autonomic nervous system (Quilmann, 
2013), the ERG\¶V systems in general (allostatic load) (McEwen, 2000),  the endocrine system 
(Meany, 2001) and the immune system (Ramo-Fernandez, et al, 2015).  Whilst an 
autoethnographic case study is unique, the study aims to have relevance beyond a single case 
by resonating with the experiences of others who present with medically unexplained 
symptoms, and the experiences of the practitioners who try to help them.  As Roth (2012) 
observed, the purpose of first-person research is to critically investigate phenomena in such a 
way as to articulate experience in terms of µFRQFUHWH XQLYHUVDOV¶ (ibid, p17).  A central 
perspective of the study, which we will return to later, is considering the practical consequences 
that stem from a SHUVRQ¶V lived experience of having a body vis-à-vis being a body.  In this 
account we will take the latter view and chart a personal journey, undergone by the FA of re-
embodiment in thought and emotion. 
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Data: critical incidents 
Critical incident one: an unexpected surge of myofascial pain 
A June day in 2014.  I am sitting in the GULYHU¶V seat with my feet operating the pedals, my 
hands on the steering wheel, shifting the gears where necessary.  The roads are busy outside 
the frame of the vehicle though I manage to synchronise our motion with the rest of the traffic 
smoothly.  ,¶P gripping the wheel a little tighter than necessary, my shoulders a little hunched.  
My wife is sat in the passenger seat, her seatbelt positioned so as to avoid her µEXPS¶ ± not 
noticeable yet to those who GRQ¶W know - and yet cushioned within a spherical layer of amniotic 
fluid, and anchored by life giving cords, are two tiny little embryos, less than 10cm in length 
each.    The prevailing idea that takes form in my mind is of having to drive safely, I increase 
our distance from the other vehicles, protecting our precious cargo from the threat of any 
sudden jerks or collisions.  ,¶P 32 and yet feel quite naïve, as though I GRQ¶W really know what 
,¶P doing, as though I were assuming the responsibility of a far better man than myself, a man 
far more µWRJHWKHU¶ than I feel.  Parking up and emerging from the car our physical mode shifts 
now ± I lift up my chest and shoulders, and although nerves would propel me along at a much 
faster pace, I consciously match my ZLIH¶V footsteps, because this is my role at this moment.     
As we enter the General Infirmary and traverse its long, utilitarian corridors, we feel anxious. 
It has been four weeks now since we last µKHDUG¶ from our twins ± in all that period where they 
are not being scanned, where their heartbeats are not being measured, anything could have 
happened, they could be struggling in there, or worse, and we wouldQ¶W have any idea about it.  
We take our seats in the waiting room with other mothers, the occasional awkward looking 
dad, and restless older children.  I place my hands self-consciously on my thighs and as we 
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exchange words I feel a little exposed, because the others in the room can hear what we are 
saying. The radiologist calls us in ± a Malaysian nurse with a warm smile and a confident 
professionalism about her.  The room is dark, the jelly is cold on my ZLIH¶V tummy, we are all 
very polite and make nervous jokes.  The ultrasound images come into focus on the screen 
above the bed as a figure appearing out of a blizzard.  The nurse announces ³WZLQ RQH´ but we 
have already seen him ± his head, his nose, his arms, his legs, and his little heart visibly beating 
away.  My eyes fill with tears and I look to my wife who is the same.  The nurse takes many 
measures of our VRQ¶V physiology, those crucial indexes of his health and development.  Then 
she introduces us to ³WZLQ WZR´ and there she appears, wriggling and kicking, testing out her 
muscles ± our daughter, so alive and so real.  We emerge from the dark room grinning and I 
feel a little guilty, not knowing what kind of a day the other families in the waiting room were 
having.  As we make our way back through and out of the hospital our pace is different now ± 
the clock has been reset and everything is fine.  I feel a familiar pain begin to creep across my 
face, starting at the base of my jaw bone ± a raw feeling, a burning and a sore tightness.  As we 
excitedly exchange reflections on what we learned today I feel the pain increasing and wonder 
why of all times the pain would be surging now.  The tipping point must have been my 
experience of the scan ± was it the WZLQV¶ clean bill of health, the relief that I must have felt; 
was it perhaps the heralding of a different phase of anxiety ± WKH\¶UH healthy so now I have the 
luxury of worrying about my responsibilities as father and provider, am I really big enough and 
strong enough for this task? 
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The next critical incident articulates the original psychosocial context in which the 
MUS first emerged. 
 
Critical incident two: a trauma after a sudden death 
A Friday evening in June, in the year 2000.  ,¶P eighteen years old, and I have just come 
through the door of our terraced house in West Yorkshire.  The grownups are away ± WKH\¶YH 
gone on a road trip.  The house suggests silently  the jobs I was meant to be doing; plants that 
need watering, a pile of washing by the sink. The A-level exams are still in process but I seem 
not to be taking these very seriously.  Today ,¶YH been working in a factory, packing boxes ± I 
FRXOGQ¶W pass up on the chance at some extra cash.  I feel excited as the weekend is just 
beginning.  Soon people start arriving, and the whole tone of the house changes ± the volume 
increases, the music brings its own atmosphere, joints are being rolled and smoked, the smoke 
infuses throughout the living room and the kitchen. I have only recently discovered ecstasy, 
and I take two now ± swallowing the chalky, bitter tasting pills down in one go with a swig of 
water, feeling slightly nauseated in the process.  There is a knock on the door and I go straight 
for it, but I see before I get there that there is a policeman on the outside.  I panic and call out 
µLW¶V the SROLFH¶ and quickly everyone scarpers to hide anything incriminating.  I feel a wave of 
panic come over me ± that naughty boy feeling of butterflies when you know \RX¶UH in a lot of 
trouble.  However the policeman is not interested in the drugs.   How exactly he broke the news 
is now something of a hole in my memory but I learn that there has been a road accident.  Two 
members of our family are dead and another is critically ill in hospital.  What I do remember 
is feeling like I am losing my balance; staggering back into the living room, crying without 
restraint.  Then I head back through the front door and cry some more out in the road.  The 
policeman, even I can tell, is finding this assignment extremely difficult and GRHVQ¶W quite know 
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what to say or do.  The next few hours are a blur ± phone calls made to the hospital for news 
and to others who might be able to help.  I remember the familiar physical sensations of the 
ecstasy starting to take effect ± a warm tingling in my extremities and a lightness that passes 
throughout my body, pleasure in every inhale and exhale.  And I feel guilty for having this 
completely inappropriate physical experience amidst this disaster scene.   
The morning after the physical experience is typical of any µFRPH GRZQ¶ from an 
ecstasy trip as I experienced them ± slight nausea; slight headache; heavy eyes; concentration 
that slips and slips almost like a fever; and crucially a sore jaw.  The sore jaw is a typical 
experience amongst ecstasy users ± during the high, one typically grinds their teeth and tenses 
their jaw muscles for hours on end.  Usually the soreness dissipates over the day or so; I am 
the only one as far as I know whose jaw pain became chronic after a period of ecstasy use.  The 
jaw pain is a permanent feature in my life ± some days are harder than others but the intensity 
of the pain seems to depend very much on what is currently happening; my present environment 
and experience.   
The common factor in these two otherwise disparate critical incidents the physical 
experience of pain. It is beyond reasonable doubt that the body is remembering and in a sense 
reliving something of that time, but what is it actually remembering? Rothschild suggests that 
we look beyond (or beneath) the narrative memory of that traumatic time; that is to say, we 
look to implicit memories (Rothschild, 2000).  Implicit memories are those that are not rooted 
in one particular time or situation ± most of us know how to hold and use a pen without needing 
to recall the particular times in childhood when we learned these skills.  We remember the 
physical procedure and we do this remembering without thought.  I form a mental picture of 
3DYORY¶V dogs, salivating upon the sound of the bell, as Rothschild makes the case that post-
traumatic stress symptoms are examples of classic conditioning ± the entirely healthy way in 
which we make associations between particular stimuli and concomitant events/consequences, 
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typically so that we have a preconscious means of detecting and avoiding situations that are 
dangerous or frightening, or of being drawn to situations that may hold the promise of 
something good.   Implicit elements of traumatic experience may be identified: these would 
not be unique to that situation but would be elements we will have encountered before and 
indeed have encountered since.  That night, as with any ecstasy trip, concentration drifted.  It 
would not hold in place; I felt groundless, not able to take hold of a situation that seemed to 
slip through my fingers.  I remembered feeling hollow ± almost literally out of not eating, but 
also of being a little fragile and exposed, the way you might feel if you were coming down 
with a cold but you were still at work or had business to do in town.    The tidal wave of events 
seemed to sweep me up violently and without my consent leading to the experience of 
becoming a passenger and to the fact that an ability to surf upon or otherwise navigate these 
currents of life was found wanting; beyond my capability and level of skill.  Continuing the 
seafaring metaphor, in such situations the vessel may appear steady and under control, but I 
am merely bailing out the water. Seen through this lens the jaw pain is not so much a symbol 
pointing back to that particular time and situation, but rather an index to a complicated web of 
associations ± certain physical modes that I shift through in many diverse times and situations.  
It became what Freud might have called a µERXQGDU\ LGHD¶ (Freud 1954, p154) ± a symbol that 
can enter consciousness and indeed prevail in consciousness; it is associated with the trauma 
but crucially along a chain of associations is one step removed ± its function being to protect 
us from a conscious reliving of the traumatic experiences.  As to the question of why it was 
that jaw pain became that symbol, Freud would perhaps have regarded it as quite appropriate: 
µ,I the traumatic event formed an outlet for itself in a motor manifestation, it will be this that 
becomes the boundary idea and the first symbol of the repressed PDWHULDO¶ (ibid p.154). 
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In the traumatic situation I was powerless, there was very little I could actually do, but 
channeling all that excess tension to the jaw was something that I was inadvertently doing, and 
this pattern appears to have become locked in.   
 
Reflection: themes of alienation in the patient experience  
 
Writing about her PRWKHU¶V experiences living with chronic pain, Wilbers observed that when 
the physician can discern no tangible µFDXVH¶ of the pain, and where there is no objective way 
of quantifying the pain, that sufferers of chronic pain can feel their symptoms are not being 
taken seriously, they FDQ¶W surely be as bad as they are making out (2015).  Wilbers reflects 
that when there is µGLDJQRVWLF XQFHUWDLQW\¶ about the cause of the pain, there can be a stigma 
associated with the person and their complaints that would not be present had they been 
suffering with a legitimate diagnosis such as cancer.  In such circumstances physicians can 
become suspicious about a SHUVRQ¶V motivations, suspecting secondary gains such as a SHUVRQ¶V 
desire for disability benefit payments or opioid base pain killers (ibid).  The danger of this 
growing suspicion between doctor and patient is this can lead to the relationship becoming 
strained or even hostile and thus the collapse of any capacity for empathy that may have been 
possible (Elwood, 2012).  When Ann Neville--DQ¶V doctor decided that her own pain was 
µSV\FKRJHQLF¶ she felt this was tantamount to him washing his hands of the situation ± if the 
pain was µDOO in the KHDG¶ then somehow it ZDVQ¶W real (Neville-Jan, 2003). Subsequently she 
feared admitting to doctors she was taking antidepressants in case this only validated their 
dismissal of her physical complaints.  However in her autoethnography Neville-Jan neatly 
dispatched with the false dichotomy between mental and physical aetiology: µ,V it psychogenic 
or real? The answer is LW¶V SDLQ¶ (ibid).   Neville-Jan reported feeling the pressure to 
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deliberately look unwell for her consultations; she felt as though the doctor would be looking 
at her and thinking that she looked too good to be suffering as much as she said. The FAs 
experience of chronic pain is that although it is never debilitating, it is a permanent fixture of 
his experience, it always makes it presence known, and yet in the medical consultations he 
appears to be fit, well and functioning; thriving even.  Under the care of a dental surgeon, he 
was once asked to rate his pain on a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 was no pain at all and 10 was 
worst pain ever.  He struggled with placing his experience on a one-dimensional scale when it 
seemed to take on meaning, value and quantity in the context of an ecology of references and 
associations.  He felt the pressure to talk up his pain and so gave it a µ¶  Months later, 
following a treatment of botox injections that was intended to paralyse his jaw muscles and 
thus afford them a rest, he was asked to give his pain another rating.  His best answer at that 
time was a µ¶ that the surgeon then cited as evidence that the botox injections had made a 
positive difference although he sat there knowing that the injections had not made any 
difference and mumbled something to the effect that he must have overstated the pain in the 
first place.  Such is the challenge of communicating an intensely subjective experience in such 
a fashion such as it can be ascribed an economic value.       
 
Although the various practitioners were courteous, kind even, he has felt like a piece of 
flesh to be worked on, as a mechanic would work on a broken down machine.  The FA has 
been prescribed a change of diet, jaw exercises, pain killers, anti-depressants, a mouth guard 
to wear in the nighttime, and the aforementioned botox injections for the pain.  Independently 
he has tried osteopathy, has bought magnesium oils to rub into the site of the jaw tension, and 
has had two long term periods of counselling.  However all those diverse treatments were 
experienced as so many fragments - they threw the kitchen sink at it and nothing helped.  This 
left him feeling frustrated, at a loss of faith that anything now can make any difference with 
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corresponding feelings of self-blame and failure, an experience reported by other sufferers of 
chronic pain (as in Doran, 2014).    The image is of a patient who has no voice, no capacity to 
articulate his own illness and is only playing a passive role within his own care.    Aside from 
a basic exchange of information between patient and practitioner, the conversation between 
them can typically be little more than a social convention whilst the practitioner does their 
work.  This localism is understandable ± to treat a cancer we need to kill or otherwise take out 
the cancerous cells; to fix a hearing impairment a hearing aid is fitted.  However the physical 
site may be more appropriately considered as the epicentre of the pathology, and from here its 
effects ripple out through the whole body.   
As Kierans observed in the narratives of people with chronic kidney failure:  µ+HDGDFKHV 
nausea, pain, excesses of bodily hair, weight gain, and so on are also markers of manifold 
bodily sensations and imagery that become subject to constant interpretation and meaning-
PDNLQJ¶ (2005 p348).  It may even be that the physical site of the pathology may serve as the 
material symbol of a more complex pathology.  So, in this study, as discussed, the jaw pain is 
also an index for mental states that include the slipping of attention, the inability to get a 
foothold, or the feeling of being out of RQH¶V depth.  To work at the physical site of pain alone 
would seem a rather primitive attitude ± if the smoke alarm is sounding we would not 
necessarily try to repair the alarm itself but search for the source of the smoke.   
We hypothesise that such examples of unacknowledged pain, dismissal of the FOLHQW¶V 
point of view and therapeutic pressure to conform to the SUDFWLWLRQHU¶V point of view are 
pervasive in the therapy profession as well as the medical profession.  The failure to 
acknowledge the FOLHQW¶V point of view is well-documented.  Fonagy and Bateman (2006), 
speaking specifically about borderline personality disorder, ascribe the phenomenon to the 
WKHUDSLVW¶V failure to understand mentalisation and see the FOLHQW¶V mind as separate from the 
WKHUDSLVW¶V mind.  Driven by clinical theory, relational or otherwise, the therapist fails to 
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appreciate the state of mind of the client.  This may result in pseudo mentalising in which the 
client tries to please the therapist by conforming to his/her point of view as in the above 
examples or it may lead to anger (ibid, p.2) or just failing to return to sessions.  Lees (2016b) 
gives an example of failing to address the physical pain of a client suffering from 3DUNLQVRQ¶V 
disease because of a preoccupation with relationality and how it was necessary for the therapist, 
once he had realized this, to comment on the distance between the FOLHQW¶V and the WKHUDSLVW¶V 
point of view.    
 
The next critical incident gives a thick description of the )$¶V experience of depersonalisation 
which seems to indicate a dysfunctional relationship between the conscious, decision making 
parts and other body parts more typically in the autonomic domain.   Subsequent reflection 
indicates that dissociative symptoms serve as another psychosomatic response to the original 
traumatic episode. 
   
 
Critical incident three: depersonalisation attack on the bus whilst reading a newspaper 
A bright May afternoon in 2013.  ,¶P standing at a bus stop in the centre of town with one or 
two others looking down the road waiting for our bus to appear.  ,¶YH just been to a meeting 
and am smartly dressed, I had made a lot of notes and have a lot of ideas to digest but rather 
than digesting them now I am allowing my thoughts just to wander, and this is more out of 
tiredness than any healthy decision ± too much for me to process right now.  As the bus arrives 
I take my usual window seat and retrieve the newspaper from my bag.  My physical experience 
is of being firmly planted in my seat, my body shifting as the bus turns, my arms are raised 
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before me and the texture of the newspaper between my thumb and fingers is rough.  My 
attention tunes in to the content of the newspaper and I read through an article as long as it 
holds my interest ± in the Middle East Israeli jets have entered Syrian airspace to target a 
weapons facility, and in Germany a 93 year old former Auschwitz guard has been arrested on 
charges of murder.   I µIRUJHW¶ that ,¶P sat on my seat on the bus, or about the pressure the 
window makes against my arm and shoulder as we go around a corner, and particularly about 
the feel of the paper in my hands - my awareness is centered around the content of the 
individual articles and my reactions to them; the judgements I make.  7KHUH¶V nothing strange 
about this ± neurobiologist Bernard Baars referred to the spotlight of selective attention 
(Blackmore, 1996); that in consciousness remain only the necessary elements as illuminated 
by the spotlight, with other elements falling back into the shadows, and because the physical 
elements slip out of conscious awareness it becomes a disembodied experience.   What is 
strange is what happens next ± suddenly, as though a tipping point has been reached, I have an 
awareness that I can no longer µIHHO¶ the paper between my fingers.  It is as though my holding 
the paper has become a conscious idea before the sensation of me holding it returns to 
awareness.  My experience of this is described best at first as an µRXW of body H[SHULHQFH¶ ± are 
those my arms holding the paper? I become very afraid all of a sudden and shake the paper and 
slightly jump in my seat so as to remind myself that yes these are my limbs, yes I am embodied.  
I am relieved to observe that no-one else on the bus seems to have noticed my wobble, and the 
fear quickly passes. 
 
Reflection: towards explanations of dissociation and depersonalisation  
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To gain a sense of what it felt like try sitting with your hands still on your lap, but then 
whilst your arms physically remain where they are imagine that they raise and open up as 
though to hold a newspaper.  There is the impression that the arms are there but WKHUH¶V nothing 
of substance about them ± they appear as phantom limbs.  In his own autoethnographic account 
A Leg to Stand On, Sacks gives an account of his recovery after a serious climbing accident 
detached the quadriceps muscle in his left leg.  Although the operation to repair the damage 
was a success, in the days following the operation Sacks experienced a complete disassociation 
from his leg ± it no longer felt like his leg, completely paralysed, a dead weight, and wrote 
about it seeming to exist in another dimension, with its own kind of reality  
µ7KH more I gazed at that cylinder of chalk, the more alien and incomprehensible it appeared 
to me.  I could no longer feel it was µPLQH¶ as part of me.  
(Sacks, 1984 p72)  
In 6DFNV¶ account it is as though his PLQG¶V remembering of what his leg ought to be like, how 
it ought to feel, did not chime with how the leg presented itself, thus triggering for him 
terrifying anxieties about the nature of existence itself.   Indeed when Sacks did eventually 
recover sensation and movement, and was able to walk again he had described his experience 
as a spiritual drama and a journey to the underworld and back (ibid).  Whilst 6DFNV¶ experience 
was sustained and the more terrifying for that, the momentary experience of physical 
derealisation had a similar nature.  But this begs the question as to why, if the sensation of the 
paper in between the fingers slipping out of consciousness is an entirely natural event, 
something that would happen to any of us, how then it became a frightening disassociation 
event.   Returning to the experience of chronic pain in the light of this we take the view that 
the experiences display a phobia of numbness and paralysis.  It is as though numb limbs, such 
as you might encounter had you been sleeping in an awkward position in the night, have 
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become a symbol of death.  In addition to flight or fight strategies the human being may 
alternatively deploy a µFRQVHUYDWLRQ-ZLWKGUDZDO¶ mechanism, in which parasympathetic 
nervous system activity predominates over sympathetic activity and one is immobile, passive 
and unresponsive (Schoenberg, 2007).  We may imagine scenarios in which neither flight nor 
fight is possible ± where there is no escape ± and so instead one freezes, plays dead, with a 
potential evolutionary return if the aggressor then loses interest and moves on.  However as 
Levine (1997) observes, this immobilisation can potentially be traumatic ± the impulse towards 
a surge in sympathetic activity through the fight or flight mechanism is not discharged.  When 
we go into freeze mode it is as though we apply the brakes whilst we are still accelerating thus 
creating a µIRUFHIXO turbulence in the body resembling a WRUQDGR¶ (ibid p27).  The internal re-
cycling of affect can easily be imagined in the case of a person appearing outwardly composed 
and instead channeling all that excess of affect into jaw tension.  Experiences of disassociation 
seem to appear in times of heightened anxiety and stress.  It is like an overflow mechanism, 
like the overflow in a sink. We can cope with and digest the stresses and anxieties of every day 
up to a threshold level, but beyond this point psychosomatic symptoms are activated ± it is as 
though they have become receptacles for excesses of affect.    
 
Having a body vis-à-vis being a body 
 
Where we experience our selves dualistically the body performs physical functions, such as 
digesting food, circulating blood and oxygen, and providing locomotion when the mind wills 
it so, but the mind is the source of ideas, of decision making and memory; the mind is still 
synonymous with the spirit that depends on the body but is not the same as the body.  As such 
we experience ourselves as having a body. In contrast embodied consciousness notices how 
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the stomach churns in anxiety and fear, how the cheeks flush with blood when we feel 
embarrassed, how eyes can fill with tears of sadness or joy, and how glaring teeth or tense 
muscles may indicate a sense that one is under attack.  We then experience ourselves as being 
a body.   
It is easer to appreciate the experience of being a body when somatic symptoms quieten.  
We can then identify with layers of bone and muscle, bile and blood and circulatory organs 
and tissues, the brain and the central nervous system and the nervous fibers branching out to 
all extremities, and the bulbs of sensory organs through which we relate with other bodies.  
However this is easily overwhelmed by the more common concept that we have a body, and 
indeed that it has to be disciplined (Frank, 2010).  Periods of tiredness, or of being on a low 
ebb, or of a lot of feelings to digest and work through, are unwelcome distractions when we 
have much work to do.  Rather than heeding these calls for a change in rhythm or position, we 
opt to push on through; the agenda setting part of the mind overrides these apparently unwanted 
and unproductive physical aspects.  It often tends to be in precisely those moments when we 
opt to push on through that the pain surges, a pattern observed by other sufferers of chronic 
pain (see Doran, 2014).   
We take the view that the  journey that has been described in this article, charts a 
tentative personal migration from a state of having a body - from the mind/body dualism 
implicit in that idea - towards an internalised sensibility of being a body, i.e. that we are our 
body.  Practically this means responding to the ebbs and flows of being a body, resisting the 
urge to µSXVK on WKURXJK¶ and embracing the spectrum of emotions that colour our perceptions 
rather than attempting to rise above to a more µREMHFWLYH¶ position. Contemporary literature 
advocates a more collaborative approach to the treatment of psychosomatic conditions, with a 
deeper quality of communication between the patient and practitioners, and indeed between 
the practitioners themselves (as in Edwards et al 2010, Druss & Walker 2011, and Burton 
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2014).  The division of labour in conventional medicine can have the effect of excluding the 
emotional colouring of experience from the sphere of legitimate medical data, and likewise 
that psychotherapy, in the pursuit of free association and metaphor, loses its moorings in 
biology and ecology; from where psyche owes her origins.  The FA has found that as he is able 
to re-embody thought and emotion, that depersonalisation attacks are less frightening, and 
indeed less common.  The acceptance and recognition of vulnerabilities - such as, in the case 
of this investigation, a phobia of numbness and paralysis ± also had the effect that in real-time 
experiences of depersonalisation the symptoms could be µWXUQHG GRZQ¶ or would dissipate 
altogether.  In this case progress with the jaw pain was less tangible and understanding the 
triggers and patterns of the pain is much clearer.  Nevertheless the symptoms have demanded 
reflection upon them and this has facilitated a heightened level of self-awareness and an ability 
to see oneself as a body, rather than as merely having a body. 
The essential issue here for therapists is whether therapeutic practice supports FOLHQWV¶ 
experience of being in a body or not. Our hypothesis is that it does not because of excessive 
psychologising as a result of the emphasis on the relationship and the underlying antagonisms 
towards medical thinking and by implication somatic phenomena.  When therapists do focus 
on somatic experiences they tend to do so in a relational and psychologising way.  An example 
of this would be the concept of somatic countertransferenece which is viewed as informing the 
therapist of the inner psychological state of the client (Orbach, 2009).  In other words the body 
is psychologised.  Only when the body is addressed as body is the reality of being a body fully 
addressed; otherwise it remains an appendage of the psyche and therapists are no different from 
those doctors referred to in the section on alienation.  They also fail to recognize the 
dissociative mechanisms described in this section.  Embodied therapy requires an explicit focus 
on the body.   
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Implications for Practice 
Those therapists who have experienced being both patient and practitioner, and have 
researched into this, find that their practice is influenced and shaped by the research.  For 
instance, as a practicing psychological therapist presently working with people who suffer with 
medically unexplained symptoms, the FA follows his own principle of regarding symptoms as 
serving as an overflow for excesses of affect and has found it important to treat symptoms as 
symptoms.  Very typically in the therapy literature psychosomatic symptoms are treated as 
serving a symbolic function, and as such have to be decoded.   However this approach does not 
tend to be helpful to the sufferer and may reaffirm the idea that the symptoms are µDOO in your 
KHDG¶ even though they know that the symptoms are very real.  Furthermore, therapeutic focus 
on the symptoms in and of themselves may collude with the person¶V increasing preoccupation 
with them ± a tendency that is known to lead to less healthy behavioural patterns, which in turn 
exacerbate the symptoms further (as in Webster et al, 2015).  Treating symptoms as symptoms 
communicates to the sufferer that medically unexplained symptoms can, and often do, naturally 
recede as wider quality of life, self-esteem, and capacity for emotional experience improves. 
Recognising the materiality of symptoms, it is for the GP and other health professionals to 
work on the symptoms e.g. through pain relief or physical therapies.  Instead we stress the 
importance of assisting the person to develop an embodied awareness ± becoming more aware 
of the psychosocial triggers, patterns and contexts that underpin the flare-ups of symptoms.  
This awareness can be encouraged through the deployment of autoethnographic methods such 
as diarying where the patient is willing and able to do this. The process of contextualization of 
symptoms enables the sufferer to develop their own narrative account of their condition within 
their life story as retold in the therapeutic situation.  As the evidence indicates, people who are 
able to develop their own narrative explanation for their symptoms have a better prognosis than 
those who are mystified by them (Deary et al, 2006).  The person may thus be assisted in 
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identifying more helpful health beliefs and patterns of behaviour that enable them to live well 
despite their condition.  Recognising the social dynamics of medically unexplained symptoms, 
and particularly the stigma often associated with these, it is also important for the person to be 
assisted in managing the impact of the condition on their relationships ± for example with 
partners, carers, family, and work colleagues ± and indeed over their own identity: how their 
own sense of being in the world has been challenged by their condition.  Finally, as trauma 
often serves as a seminal event in the appearance of medically unexplained symptoms and 
especially in functional syndromes such as fibromyalgia, therapists should not only attend to 
the question of when symptoms first appeared but also the appropriateness of doing trauma 
work with the person.  Here Levine (1997) and Rothschild (2000) provide essential guidance 
for the practitioner.  It is our belief that a person does not need a concrete diagnosis or medical 
explanation for their physical symptoms in order for them to begin to make substantial progress 
in sense making and improving their quality of life.  Indeed talking therapy with its emphasis 
on context and meaning is well placed to accommodate the psychosocial dynamics of 
uncertainty.  
 
Conclusion 
 
We have endeavoured in this article to demonstrate through thick descriptive accounts of 
somatic symptoms, the wider contexts in which these symptoms are expressed.    A GP ascribed 
the term µdepersonalisation attacks¶ to the )$¶V strange out of body experiences years ago but 
it was only recently upon reflection in depth that the connection with a phobia of numbness 
and paralysis and its basis in  traumatic experience became apparent.  This then provided 
significant relief from those symptoms.   
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Thick description accounts demonstrate that if we are to make sense of medical conditions that 
for whatever reason have become µVWXFN¶ particularly where there are discernible 
psychosomatic qualities, we may consider a great many layers of personhood, and symptoms 
and pathologies reverberate throughout these.  An ongoing process of recontextualisation may 
yield tangible insights about the aetiology, management of and recovery from those symptoms.  
Thus ethnography, as a result of broadening the scope and viewing old problems through fresh 
eyes, must be considered a crucial research strand.   
In view of these considerations there is a strong case for further research into the multi-layered 
contexts of medically unexplained symptoms ± patient narratives of their experiences may be 
enlightening, but so may the experiences of counsellors and psychotherapists whom will assist 
the person in uncovering these contexts.  Research that aimed to understand the processes 
through which recontextualisation was facilitated, what recontextualisation looked like, and 
the tangible consequences this had for the management, incidence, and experiencing of 
symptoms may lead to important innovations in the care offered by counsellors and 
psychotherapists and thereby give psychological therapists a greater sense of confidence and 
direction when encountering these often mysterious physical symptoms.   
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